Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Ernst Fehr,Simon Gächter — Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000)Ernst Fehr; Simon Gächter · 2000 · Article · Abstract; results sectionEstablishedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0593 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Logic of collective action · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“In public-goods experiments, Fehr and Gächter found that cooperation declined over repeated rounds without sanctions but rose substantially when participants could punish free-riders at a cost to themselves.”
Evidence that supports
1Evidence that contradicts
1Economists free ride, does anyone else? Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV
Gerald Marwell,Ruth E. Ames — Economists free ride, does anyone else? Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV (1981)Gerald Marwell; Ruth E. Ames · 1981 · Article · Most subjects contributed more than narrow self-interest predictsContext
Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?
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