Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Allan Gibbard — Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Allan Gibbard · 1973 · Article · p. 587EstablishedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0590 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Social choice theory · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem establishes that every non-dictatorial voting rule with at least three possible outcomes is manipulable: some voter can sometimes gain by misreporting preferences.”
Evidence that supports
3Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Mark Allen Satterthwaite — Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Mark Allen Satterthwaite · 1975 · ArticleSocial Choice Theory
Christian List — Social Choice Theory (2022)Christian List · 2022 · Web page · Section 3.5Evidence that contradicts
0No counter-evidence recorded.
Context
The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1998 (Amartya Sen)
Status history
No earlier revisions.
Disputes
No disputes have been filed.