An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization
Peter T. Leeson — An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization (2007)Peter T. Leeson · 2007 · Article · abstract, p. 1049DisputedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0395 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Golden Age pirate ship articles · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“Pirate crews were organised as constitutional democracies with checks and balances, an efficient solution to the problem of predatory captains and to conflict among crew.”
Context. Rediker reads the same evidence as sailors' class solidarity; critics note that few articles survive, mostly via a single sensational source, and that forced recruitment and violence fit poorly with a model of consent.
Evidence that supports
2The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates
Peter T. Leeson — The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (2009)Peter T. Leeson · 2009 · BookEvidence that contradicts
0No counter-evidence recorded.
Context
Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age
Status history
No earlier revisions.
Disputes
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